I had the good
fortune to hear Brigadier Doug Chalmers talk last week at Exeter’s new Security and
Strategy Institute about his recent experience
of commanding the U.K’s Task Force Helmand in Afghanistan. The talk had a particular
operational focus on the main effort of British forces, Nad-e-Ali district in
central Helmand, during which Brigadier Chalmers emphasised how things ‘were
better than when we arrived’ when he left and that he was ‘cautiously
optimistic’ about Afghanistan’s future. Heat maps of Nad-e-Ali district were
produced to show how insurgent activity had been forced outside the
predetermined centres of gravity in the district, including markets, roads and coalition/ANSF
bases, by joint British and Afghan efforts. Photos of an empty market ‘then’
and a bustling one ‘now’ seemed to showcase the improvement. So far, so nothing
new.
The real problem
for me came when Brigadier Chalmers – who is obviously incredibly capable,
intelligent and well-read on COIN and the history of Helmand – spoke about the
micro-econometrics by which he judged the campaign. The presence of butchers
selling beef in the market was a good indicator of growing trade and confidence
because, in the 45 degree heat of the Afghan summer and without refrigeration
facilities, each butcher had to be certain he would sell his cuts the same day
he slaughtered his cattle. The sale of tomatoes in the market, which have to be
imported from Iran and Pakistan, showed that the roads were safe and that
normal commercial flows were returning to the region (although the same could
be argued of flows of weapons/insurgents no doubt?). Finally, the fact that
solar-powered public lighting installed by development aid projects remained on
the main street and had not been pilfered demonstrated that there was a growing
sense of community within the town and with that a wider sense of confidence
about Afghanistan. If ever one could seize on Nagl and Kilcullen’s micro-indicators
of success, then Brigadier Chalmers surely had, and on the face of it, such arguments
seem convincing. Until you consider the macro-indicators of the wider campaign.
Firstly, the heat
map of Nad-e-Ali; it’s all well and good keeping the insurgents out of the
centres of gravity for the moment, but there is not much evidence to suggest
that this will continue once coalition forces leave the area and handover
security duties to the Afghans. The purple lozenges of security are more likely
to shrink and the red swathes of enemy activity are more likely to grow when
the ANSF are left to their own devices. The gains made by joint coalition/ANSF
operations are unlikely to be maintained when the drive and professionalism of
NATO forces is removed.
Taking the ANSF
issue to the strategic level there are also four other major issues.
Firstly, the
current rate of attrition in the ANA (as of November 2012) is officially 2 per cent per month. God knows why
NATO decides to quantify attrition rates on a monthly basis but I suspect the
fact that this means that the ANA is losing 24 per cent of its personnel every
year has something to do with it. This is simply unsustainable, and is likely
to get worse, not better, as coalition troops withdraw and ANA units take the
lead in combat ops.
Secondly, while we
constantly hear that Afghans are now leading over 80 per cent of all operations,
and they are currently conducting 85 per cent of their own training, there is
little mention that that in the last year ISAF has lowered its
criteria of classification for ANA (35th
minute) units to be capable of independent operations, thereby allowing more
units in the lower categories to qualify for the highest category.
Thirdly, the
central metric of the Afghan campaign is an economic one. Although it has
experienced rapid economic growth recently – the IMF estimates Afghanistan’s
GDP to be over $19 billion – without the inflation generated by over 100,000
NATO troops and their support staff, the country’s GDP is historically close to
$12 billion. The cost of training and equipping an ANSF of 352,000 is forecast
by the U.S to be $4-6 billion a year for the foreseeable future, depending on
their size. Thus, funding its security forces will cost Afghanistan about a
third to a half of its actual GDP every year. This is simply unsustainable.
Fourthly, such a
fact presents a clear rationale for cutting the size of the ANSF. 230,000 has
been the number suggested. Yet even if
you take into account that half of Afghanistan’s population may not require a
dense ANSF presence, to secure the remaining 15 million inhabitants or so would
require a force ratio far greater than this allows. Indeed, forces this size
would fall far short of the number required by NATO’s own doctrine to
successfully conduct a counter-insurgency campaign. Such doctrine holds that
20-25 counter-insurgents are needed per 1,000 members of the population. Even
given the geographic concentration of Afghanistan’s insurgency in the south and
east of the country, the 230,000 figure falls far below this ratio. Again, big
strategic problems remain unsolved.
So, as you can
see, there are for more telling metrics that can be used to assess the
likelihood of strategic success in the Afghan campaign than beef, tomatoes and
solar panels. And the metrics included
here are simply some of those related to the ANSF, others on security, corruption,
Pakistan’s interference, and wider economic figures could also be used to
triangulate the strategic direction of Afghanistan.. While coalition forces are
to be commended for undoubtedly delivering operational successes, it is the
failure of commanders to draw the distinction between the limits of these
successes’ relationship to the wider strategic context that worried me the
most. Perhaps speaking candidly is too much to expect from serving officers, but as a result
I was left with the sinking feeling that the ‘cautious optimism’ of the
military was simply shorthand for ‘not my pay-grade.’ Indeed, at times it felt
like there was a big-eared grey mammal laughing at the
back of the room because, strategically, the only thing that warrants cautious
optimism in Afghanistan at the moment is the prospect of a negotiated peace
settlement, and that is a long shot.
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