While NATO Secretary General Rasmussen is to be congratulated for his personal commitment to Afghanistan (The Daily Telegraph, 23rd October 2012), as should his wider organisation and the men and women of our own armed forces, some of the statistics quoted in his Telegraph Op-Ed remain questionable, especially in light of a report issued today by the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee that states that a viable state in Afghanistan is not achievable.
Firstly, when Mr. Rasmussen says that: 'During the first six months of this year, Afghans led over 80 per cent of all operations, and they are currently conducting 85 per cent of their own training' he fails to mention that in the last year ISAF has lowered its criteria of classification for ANA units to be capable of independent operations, thereby allowing more units in the lower categories to qualify for the highest category. This has been discussed in a recent BBC Radio File on 4 (36th minute) investigation and by Professor Cordesman of the Council on Foreign Relations in his report that questions the failed metrics of 10 years of war in Afghanistan.
Secondly, Mr. Rasmussen fails to mention that attrition in the Afghan
National Army is averaging about 2% per month throughout the year. For some
reason, ISAF prefers to give this figure as a monthly percentage rather than an
annual one. Whatever way you look at it, there is no escaping the fact that the
ANA are losing about 24% of its force a year to attrition. This is beyond what
most analysts agree is sustainable in the long term.
Thirdly, Mr. Rasmussen is picking statistics that reflect progress in
certain regions of Afghanistan at the expense of other regions with negative
trends. When he says 'in and around Kabul, enemy-initiated attacks fell by 17
per cent in the first eight months of this year, compared with the same period
last year' he fails to mention that Kabul has traditionally been one of the
safest regions with the least attacks. Moreover, the latest US Department of Defence report on
Afghanistan (page 70) describes the Kabul area of operations as ‘statistically
insignificant (less than one percent) compared to all security incidents
throughout Afghanistan’. By contrast if you take Regional Command South which
includes Kandahar province - the seat of the insurgency - as a real indicator
of progress, then according to the same report (page 119), violence actually
increased by 13% during the traditionally quieter winter period. Furthermore,
violence in RC-S represents 21% of Afghanistan's total, so this is an important
indicator.
Fourthly, Mr. Rasmussen's choice of the 'enemy-initiated attack' metric
is also questionable as it does not include potential attacks and undetonated
Improvised Explosive Device 'finds'. As the most recent UK government report has outlined, the
metric which includes these variables, known as 'security incidents' has
experienced no significant change recently.
Fifthly, Mr. Rasmussen and NATO maintain that 'transition remains on
schedule' and that 'in the course of 2013, the Afghans will have the lead for
security throughout their country.' These plans are indeed, on schedule, but
the key qualitative and quantitative question here is 'transition to what
exactly'? Given the wider context of the West’s mission in Afghanistan, transition
is not an end in itself. If NATO hands security over to Afghan forces that in
some regions are unable to venture outside their bases, then how are we to know
the accurate picture of reality? While NATO will definitely fulfil its mission of
transition, the effects of that transition remain highly uncertain and should
not be separated from the post-transition security situation.
Finally, Mr. Rasmussen's piece must be seen in the context of declining
public support for the war: 70% of Americans and 73% of Britons are now against
the war. Furthermore, the respected security think-tank International Crisis
Group has recently released a damning report on Afghanistan's
transition while the New York Times, having supported the war for the last
eleven years, published a seminal editorial entitled ‘Time to Pack up’ on 22nd October
calling for a withdrawal based on a schedule dictated only by the security of
the troops. The fact that the newspaper of the city that has most reason to see
troops remain in Afghanistan is now calling for US forces to exit speaks for
itself.
NATO and the international community have shown remarkable commitment to
Afghanistan. However, I believe the statistics quoted in Mr. Rasmussen's piece
need to be seen in their wider context. Furthermore, despite the best efforts
of NATO, the West’s wider security and stability mission in Afghanistan is
heading for strategic failure. This is due to
both our own hubris and the pervasive corruption and incompetence of those we
chose to ally ourselves with in Afghanistan. The only solid and perhaps
long-term gain we have achieved after eleven years of war is the reduction of
al-Qa’eda in the country. This had mostly been achieved by March 2002.
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