Media failing in its coverage of Afghanistan.

The death of another two British soldiers last week in Helmand was followed by the usual 30-second Colonel’s voxpop on the 10 o’clock news and accompanied by the standard release of heartfelt messages of condolence from their surviving comrades on the MoD website.  Other than the quick delivery of facts, there has been very little analysis of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan by the British media.

Before turning to why this is, a round-up of the events over the last ten days may provide some context as to what is actually going on in the country.  On 6 August the Afghan Defence Minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, quit after parliament voted to remove him over border clashes with Pakistan. Wardak was seen as a close ally of both the US and the UK whose loss ‘could have significant consequences for transition’ according a senior coalition diplomat in Helmand province.

The same day, a police chief in Ghor province was killed by an explosives-laden donkey, further evidence, if it was needed, of the success of the Taliban’s campaign to assassinate Afghan officials ahead of NATO’s 2014 withdrawal. This campaign has already seen a 53 percent increase in targeted killings of officials by the Taliban between January and June this year; somewhat offsetting  the positive news released by the UN on 8 August that civilian casualties had dropped by 15 percent during this period compared with the same period in 2011.

However, since most civilian casualties (some 77 percent) are caused by the insurgency, even if the lower civilian casualty trend continues (it won’t, July has already seen a further 5 percent erosion) what this really signifies is the insurgency is getting better at directing kinetic activity to where it matters most: onto Afghan officials and their civilian sympathisers.

Next, on the night of 9 August, three US special forces soldiers were shot dead as they broke the Ramadan fast over a meal with their Afghan colleagues in Sangin. The ‘green on blue’ incident marked the third of its kind that week: three other NATO troops were killed the same day and another a day later.  There have been 27 such attacks this year which have left at least 37 NATO soldiers dead, highlighting the increasing infiltration of the Afghan security forces since the NATO withdrawal announcement. So far, this year’s figures are on course to be  50 percent up on last year’s.

On 14 August Afghanistan experienced its worst day of violence of 2012 when suicide bombers stuck markets in Nimruz and Kunduz provinces, killing up to 50 civilians. This was followed a day later by another bomb attack on a market in Herat city that wounded 18 and then the alleged shoot-down of a US Blackhawk helicopter today that killed 11 soldiers yesterday. Afghanistan hasn’t had as bad a week as this since the urinating-on-corpses and Koran-burning scandals of January and February.

Granted summer fighting season always sees increases in attacks, but taken together and in context, these events belie the ground truth in Afghanistan: it’s not getting any better and when the West leaves it will get worse, quickly.

To be fair, the British media has reported these stories; the basic facts are easy to find online. But what is really missing is any meaningful analysis. Very few of the seasoned war correspondents seem willing to stick their necks out, call a spade a spade and reveal the West’s efforts in Afghanistan the unmitigated failure they undoubtedly are. Why is this?

The most obvious answer is to be found in the increasingly familiar relationship between the British military and the British media that has been engendered by ten years of journalists covering Britain at war. As the military control access to the battlefields, and given the dangers of reporting unilaterally, correspondents are forced to rely on the military embed system that assigns them to certain locations and military units. 

Quite simply, if a correspondent writes an article that is too far ‘off message’, the next time they apply for an embed they are likely to find their application at the bottom of the pile. And when it is eventually approved it will be for a location far removed from where the news is breaking. Editors, already averse to Afghan news after eleven years of inoculation, are not going to tolerate a defence correspondent who cannot cultivate good sources in, and stories from, the military. Generally, write something negative and you’ll find what sources you had shut up shop. Then try to earn a living as a defence correspondent.

And so, we, the public get the diluted, policy-centric version of events in Afghanistan: the positivist euphemisms of career and legacy-orientated military officers who are ‘cautiously optimistic’ about Afghanistan’s future. The constant press conferences stating that the transition to an ANSF lead remains ‘on track’ despite the reality that less than ten percent of ANSF units are able to conduct independent operations, that ethnic divisions and desertions are rapidly increasing – thereby undermining the future integrity of the ANSF, and that once security duties are handed over Western armies see it as ‘mission accomplished’ paying little attention to subsequent events on the ground.

Such facts are borne out by the recent comments made by an internal security officer in the Ghorband valley, outside Kabul, to the BBC: ‘during operations, we have found bomb-making factories, huge caches of weapons and ammunition. But the government told people “everything is fine.” They lied.’

As a security professional who has served in the British army in Afghanistan and has worked as a research analyst on the country for an international security organisation, I understand the institutional and cultural restraints that can be placed on soldiers and journalists to tow the line. Indeed, undue criticism undermines fighting power: fortitude and courage of conviction are often the difference between victory and defeat. It would be wrong to ignore that the military have delivered real operational successes in Afghanistan.

The problem is – in the military’s own words – these gains ‘remain fragile and reversible’ and have not been converted into the strategic nor the political gains needed to stabilise Afghanistan. Given the nature of Afghan culture and the Afghan state, it is highly questionable if the military could ever have delivered these anyway, even if resourced eternally. 

Unlike other interventions in Iraq and Libya, it is obvious that Afghanistan, fundamentally, is going one way, and that is down. Northern warlords are already re-arming in preparation for the coming civil war with the southern Pashtuns after NATO withdraws. ANSF troops occupying the ‘transitioned territories’ marked as green areas on headquarters’ maps are increasingly confined to their bases and will be more so when the West leaves. Expect a more savvy Taliban to gradually take back territories British and other nations’ blood was spilt on as what’s left of the NATO force positions itself in a few major population centres. 

Which brings me back to the latest British soldiers to be killed. Of course they knew the risk of their vocation and of course they died doing a job they loved. But suggesting that that job, in Afghanistan, is going to have a tangible and long-lasting effect is flying in the face of evidence.  And logically, if we are leaving in 2014/15 regardless of whether the job is done or not, then why not leave it not-done in 2012? It would save hundreds of lives.

However, it appears that losing the battle for public perceptions is a fate worse than death for the West’s strategic communications specialists.

An officer recently told me that when he arrived in Camp Bastion at the beginning of his tour, a colonel addressed his group, saying that – and I ad lib here – ‘they needed to see the job through to honour those who have given their lives.’ When the sacrifices of those who have gone before are cited as the primary reason to sacrifice those who live today, we know the situation is beyond saving.

Now, not in 2014, the West should leave the areas that will slip to insurgent control and concentrate its dwindling forces in areas where they can have long lasting effect and conduct counter-terror strikes if need be.  Expending young men and women’s lives in districts that will effectively ‘transition’ to Taliban control in two years anyway is simply the pursuance of a failing strategy that runs counter to reality.

Afghanistan: The metrics of strategic failure.

Those attending the NATO summit on Afghanistan on Sunday in Chicago have a lot to reflect on. So far, 2012 has not been a good year for the organisation nor the country. The killing last Saturday of two British servicemen again highlighted the increasing ‘Green on Blue’ attacks by Afghan security personnel on NATO soldiers, while US Marines urinating on corpses, Korans being burnt, the murder of 17 Afghan civilians by a renegade American sergeant and a large attack on Kabul have all represented serious political setbacks. These setbacks have been all the more significant given that the military campaign cannot now save the West from long-term strategic failure.

This is not to say the military have failed in their mission: in the regions where they have been sufficiently resourced, strong tactical and operational gains were made during 2010/11 in the key provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. The transition of security duties to Afghan forces also remains on schedule.  However, these successes have not translated into the strategic, and ultimately, the political gains it the surge was designed to deliver.

In the 2007 Iraq surge, for example, violence decreased by about 70% in five months. In doing so it created the space within which governance and the rule of law could begin to be established. Twelve months into the surge in Afghanistan, the U.N estimated that violence had risen by 39%; governance remains patchy at best. Furthermore, violence is increasing even in areas that are meant to be secure: attacks in the Kandahar region rose by 13% over the winter 2011/12 period. Attacks in the East were up 3%. Taken together, these figures indicate that in the two regions where insurgent violence is most concentrated, attacks have continued to rise, even during the traditionally more benign winter months.

Meanwhile, NATO states populations’ support for the war is at their lowest levels ever (27 percent in the U.S), France and Australia have already announced accelerated withdrawal timetables and progress toward a political settlement has stalled. A December  2011 US National Intelligence Estimate concluded that pervasive corruption and Kabul’s incompetent governance had undercut the surge’s security gains and that President Karzai’s government might not survive a NATO withdrawal at all. Basic metrics support this view.

The central statistic of the Afghan campaign is an economic one. Although it has experienced rapid economic growth recently – the IMF estimates Afghanistan’s GDP to be over $19 billion – without the inflation generated by over 100,000 NATO troops and their support staff, the country’s GDP is historically close to $12 billion. The cost of training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is forecast by the U.S to be $4-6 billion a year for the foreseeable future, depending on their size. Thus, funding its security forces will cost Afghanistan about a third to a half of its actual GDP every year. This is simply unsustainable.

Of course, the U.S and its NATO allies are aware of this. Reports suggest that the U.S will continue to provide $5 billion next year; it hopes NATO members will make up the $1.3 billion difference. However, so far the alliance has only raised $550 million (Britain has given $110 million), leaving a significant shortfall in ANSF funding. Moreover, the long term sustainability of even this amount is in question. With Europe’s financial woes continuing, it will become increasingly difficult to justify funding an unpopular and distant war that could eventually see NATO governments supporting one side in a civil war.

Here, the echo of the Soviet experience in the country begins to reverberate loudly. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, they continued to fund and equip President Najibullah’s forces. With Soviet support, the beleaguered president was able to cling to power, gradually ceding some 90% of the country to the Muhajideen insurgency as his army’s appetite for the conflict waned. However, when the Russians turned off the money tap in 1992, Najibullah’s regime rapidly crumbled. 

NATO knows that the ANSF in their current form are unsustainable. Next year, the U.S will cut in half the $11.2 billion it gave the ANSF for 2012; the net result being that, after a rush to reach ANSF manning of 352,000, the force will be reduced just as it hits this target. The latest NATO figures indicate that Afghan forces currently total 344,000, but given the long term questions over sustainability, a force of about 230,000 is now being considered more realistic. 

Forces this size would fall far short of the number required by NATO’s own doctrine to successfully conduct a counter-insurgency campaign. Such doctrine holds that 20-25 counter-insurgents are per 1,000 members of the population. Even given the geographic concentration of Afghanistan’s insurgency in the south and east of the country, the 230,000 figure falls far below this ratio. By comparison, Iraq, which has a similar population to Afghanistan, has over one million army and police personnel for its 30 million citizens. Simply put, even ignoring Pakistan’s hand in Afghanistan’s affairs, without a large and sustainable security force to suppress the insurgency, the government will be unable to hold the areas NATO forces have fought hard to clear. The only way to avoid this scenario is through some sort of political settlement.

However, in the short term at least, a political settlement seems unlikely. The Sunday assassination of Maulvi Rahmani – a top negotiator for Karzai’s High Peace Council with strong links to the Taliban– has highlighted the continuing precariousness of the negotiations process.  Mahaz-e Mullah Dadullah, a hard line insurgent faction, has claimed responsibility for the killing. Their actions indicate that many elements of the Taliban remain opposed to any negotiated settlement that would deny them the return of to an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Clinton has not spoken pro-actively on negotiations in over a year. Ahmed Rashid, a leading Afghan analyst, recently indicated that the main reason for this is due to disagreements within the U.S administration over whether the negotiations process should be prioritised at all.

Yet some sort of a political settlement is now the only way the West can arrest Afghanistan’s slide into civil war. Otherwise, on their current trajectory, the basic metrics of its eleven year investment of blood and treasure in Afghanistan point towards strategic failure. When combined with the qualitative evidence of widespread corruption the complete picture is even worse: a lack of popular support for the Afghan government, an internal Pashtun/non Pashtun divide, a massive forthcoming shortfall in aid as military assistance is cut and the continuing undermining of stability by Pakistan provides the context within which the quantitative evidence must be understood. Reports that former Northern Alliance warlords have begun re-arming in preparation for the Afghanistan NATO leaves behind suggest they understand the ground truth better than those meeting in Chicago this weekend.

Egypt: Army conscripts could prove decisive in determining future....

From the Irish Times http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2011/1126/1224308187300.html?via=rel

Momentum Grows for Labalaba VC

In an excellent article in last week's Sunday Times (pay),  Lord Ashcroft outlined the exploits of Royal Ulster Rifles and SAS soldier Sgt. Talaiasi Labalaba in the battle of Mirbat in 1972, when 9 SAS soldiers confronted an enemy force estimated to be between 250 to 400 strong.

Given the need to raise awareness of the valour of both Fijian Labalaba, and another SAS medic of Irish descent, Trooper Thomas Tobin, I have reproduced a large sections of the article below in an effort to spread the word...

“It was dawn on July 19, 1972, when the Adoo, a group of highly trained, heavily armed communist guerrillas, tried to seize the port of Mirbat on the Arabian Sea. After a series of setbacks, they were looking for a big military victory in their battle with the Sultan of Oman’s troops and their SAS allies.

The attack came during the monsoon season, on a day when it was raining lightly and with low cloud cover. The guerrillas’ initial aim was to target a small detachment of gendarmerie, slitting the throats of the eight men occupying a watch-point on the edge of the port.

However, things did not go to plan and an exchange of gunfire was heard by the nine SAS men staying in a nearby British Army Training Team house. As Kealy saw the waves of enemy rebels advancing, he was soon barking orders to his men.

Labalaba, known affectionately to his comrades as “Laba”, ran some 500 yards to a gun-pit to fire a 25-pounder gun single-handedly, even though, for maximum effect, it needed to be manned by five men.

Labalaba knew that if the gun fell into enemy hands, they would sweep through the port and so he kept up a relentless fire. As the enemy closed in on the sole soldier, Labalaba was eventually seriously wounded by a round from a Kalashnikov rifle.

“I’ve been chinned but I am okay,” he said over his walkie-talkie, his jaw in tatters. Trooper Sekonaia Takavesi, a fellow Fijian and close friend, responded by grabbing his self-loading rifle and running to the gun-pit under a hail of fire.

The two Fijians held off the advancing enemy for several minutes but Takavesi realised they needed more support, so he ran back to the small fort to get help, returning with Walid Khamis, an Omani gunner.

Khamis was the next man to be hit, falling to the floor and writhing in agony after being shot in the stomach. Shortly afterwards Takavesi was shot in the shoulder, meaning there were only two seriously injured Fijians to hold off the enemy from the gun-pit.

Labalaba realised he was almost out of ammunition and so he tried to reach a 60mm mortar nearby to continue his assault on the enemy. However, he was shot fatally in the neck as he reached for the weapon.

When the 25-pounder gun fell silent, Kealy and a volunteer, Tobin, ran to the gun-pit, again dodging enemy bullets. As Tobin tried to tend the wounded, he was shot in the face and fell to the ground.

Yet just as the situation appeared hopeless, the SAS had two strokes of luck. The first was that the cloud lifted and two jets from the Sultan’s air force were able to fly low over the scene, strafing the guerrillas with cannon fire.”

The article goes on to describe...

"Second, unknown to Kealy, other members of the SAS based at Um al-Quarif had learnt of the battle and had been ordered to travel the 35 miles to Mirbat to help their comrades.

After the cloud lifted and the SAS reinforcements were helicoptered to the edge of Mirbat, the guerrillas were soon on the retreat.

After four hours of ferocious and continuous fighting, the enemy had been defeated, leaving behind some 40 fighters who were dead or seriously wounded. The SAS lost two men — Labalaba and Tobin — but Takavesi survived and was later awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, while Kealy was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

However, Labalaba was simply mentioned in dispatches and Tobin’s bravery received no official recognition.

The reason given for the small number of gallantry awards was that the SAS were involved in a secret war and that to have awarded posthumous VCs would have drawn unwanted attention to their activities.

The failure of the authorities adequately to recognise the gallantry of Labalaba and Tobin rankles with the SAS servicemen past and present.

Peter Winner, a former SAS sergeant (whose name has been changed for security reasons), is one of the many aggrieved that Labalaba, in particular, has never received a posthumous VC.

Winner, who fought at Mirbat and later took part in the Iranian embassy siege, has said: “So to keep the war secret, all they gave him [was] MID [mentioned in dispatches]. You can get that for walking up the Falls Road [in Belfast]. The guy deserved a VC for what he did.”

A new book, SAS Operation Storm, co-authored by Roger Cole, who took part in the battle as an SAS corporal, has also championed the cause of both men.

Helen Tobin, a solicitor and one of the dead medic’s three sisters, wants justice for her brother too. “It was a battle in which a real band of brothers faced overwhelming odds and we do not believe their heroism, and that of their comrades, was ever given the recognition due. We hope ... that will be forthcoming,” she said.

The Victoria Cross was instituted by royal warrant in 1856 for what Queen Victoria said ought to be “for most conspicuous bravery or some daring pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy”.

Surely these emotive words accurately describe the circumstances in which Labalaba and Tobin lost their lives. And surely, too, the time is now right for their bravery, at long last, to be properly recognised."

I fully support Lord Ashcroft's efforts and if you do too, get tweeting and facebooking...

Sgt. Labalaba

It's Great To Know

A former soldier responds to the findings of the Commons Defence Select Committee on Operations in Afghanistan.

It’s great to know…

It’s great to know that we could never have won.

It’s great to know we were undermanned. It’s great to know we had no helicopters. It’s great to know we had no strategy. 

It’s great to know the planners didn’t plan. It’s great to know there was no intelligence. It’s great to know we were overstretched. It’s great to know the Generals didn’t say.

It’s great to know the army had its reputation to uphold. 

It’s great to know the ministers didn’t know. It’s great to know the MoD was unprepared. It’s great to know the Land Rovers were useless. It’s great to know the IEDs were dangerous.

It’s great to know there were financial constraints.

It’s great to know Iraq diverted resources. It’s great to know there was no reserve.

It’s great to know there was no co-ordination. It’s great to know there were too many face changes.

It’s great to know they were fighting too. It’s great to know about the political battles.

It’s great to know our government doesn’t hold us responsible.

It helps us forget about the friends we lost.

Afghanistan: All over bar the shouting... and dying.

President Obama’s decision on Wednesday night to begin withdrawing U.S troops from Afghanistan marks the beginning of the end of the surge he ordered 18 months ago. With America’s longest war now in its 11^th year, military and civilian casualties still rising, and the war costing the U.S over $10 billion a month, Patrick Bury outlines the Obama surge’s impact on the strategic situation in Afghanistan and what the end game in Afghanistan may look like.

President Obama’s decision to withdraw 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year, and a further 23,000 by September 2012, effectively marks the end of the surge he announced in December 2009. 18 months on, the surge has delivered operational successes where troops have been concentrated in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, but it has failed to deliver the strategic, and most importantly, political gains that Obama hoped for when he tied his presidency to the war in Afghanistan.

Leon Trotsky once remarked that “insurrection is an art, and like all arts has its own laws.” When President Obama announced the surge, he was acting on the advice of his military chiefs, who had asked for 40,000 troops to implement a comprehensive counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy centered on protecting the Afghan population. Obama gave them 30,000, choosing the COIN approach over the more limited counter- terror approach advocated as more realistic by Vice-President Biden and many others.

That such a COIN “strategy” could work was based largely on the fact that it had in Iraq, yet COIN itself was never, and never will be, a strategy in itself. It is merely the military part of an overall strategy.

Yet in Afghanistan, in the absence of coherent grand strategy, COIN has become the strategy as the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission crept further and further toward comprehensive nation building. Furthermore, as Trotsky outlined, the Afghan insurrection has laws of its own, quite apart from those of Iraq, which, combined with Afghanistan’s political, economic and social landscape, have meant that from the outset such a strategy had far less chance of success than in Iraq.

With Obama now signaling the end of the surge, he is acknowledging that these factors are insurmountable within a pragmatic political timeframe. The evidence of this is obvious for those who care to look. In a recently released UN report, Afghan civilian casualties in May totalled 368, the highest since records began in 2007 and effectively the highest since the war began in 2001. Military casualties have also soared with the surge, further undermining public support.

Also this month, the conclusion of a two year Senate Foreign Relations Committee inquiry stated that the impact of the billions of dollars of U.S development aid was questionable and in many cases had aided the insurgency. At present, military spending and development aid account for 97 per cent of country’s gross domestic product, a figure that shows just how unsustainable the whole nation building project is. And the fact that the inquiry questioned the very efficacy of using aid as a stabilisation tool over the long run has serious implications for the continued funding of an Afghan COIN/ nation building approach that is draining American coffers rapidly.

But the most significant issue that has eroded the political and public support for the war is the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan last month. There is no avoiding the fact that Al Qaeda was the reason ISAF went into Afghanistan. Now that their leader is dead and the terror network’s members number less than 100 in the country, it is very hard to explain to Americans and Europeans alike why they should fund, and their soldiers should die for, a nation building project in Afghanistan. Obama realises this, as does Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy, who have both announced their own timetables for withdrawal. Their Afghanistan adventure, it seems, is all over, bar the shouting.

Indeed, Bin Laden’s assassination has shown Afghanistan up for what it has been for years: a sideshow. Pakistan, its nuclear arsenal and its large population are now the obvious strategic prize China and the U.S will compete for. As the Afghan Security Forces increase in quantity - and at a slower pace in quality - fewer Americans and Europeans will be needed to stop the Taliban re-taking Kabul by force. Political reintegration processes may yet help stabilise the country. But, ultimately, it is all about Pakistan now.

That is one of the main reasons why America will look to keep military bases in Afghanistan after the transition to Afghan security forces in 2014. And that is why they will probably keep about 25,000 troops in the country in an advisory role after that date too. A military presence in the centre of Asia, close to both Pakistan and China, has too much strategic potential to be squandered by a complete drawdown of forces. Moreover, these troops will be ready to conduct counter-terror operations in the Af/Pak border regions, finally confirming that the counter-terror strategy was the most viable all along.

Such a 180 degree reversal of policy is tragic for the Afghan civilians and ISAF men and women who died during the surge. And for those still on the frontline in Afghanistan, whilst the shouting continues, there is much dying to be avoided in the meantime...

Security, Symbolism and History for Queen’s visit

Former army Captain and Irish security analyst Patrick Bury outlines the security and significance behind the British monarchs visit to Ireland.

About 120 plain clothed and armed Met Police officers will be accompanying the Queen on her four-day state visit to Ireland. Most of these officers will be drawn from Special Operations 1 (SO1) who guard UK diplomatic VIPs abroad, and SO14, whose remit covers the Royals exclusively. Aiding these will be Mi5 and Mi6, who will be paying particular attention to the dissident republican threat. In doing this they will be assisted by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) over the border.

The Irish and British security services have a long history of co-operation in fighting the violence of the troubles and there has already further evidence of this surrounding this visit. The PSNI have sent 2 water cannon to the Irish police (the Gardai), should they need it. There has been close surveillance of known dissidents, and some arrests both sides of the border. The Gardai have moved assets north, and close liaison between the intelligence services continues.

In Ireland itself the biggest security operation in the history of the state is now fully underway. 8,000 uniformed Gardai, out of a force 14,000, are directly involved, supported by 2,000 members of the Irish Defence Forces on standby. Other Irish units operating are the Special Detective Unit, the Emergency Response Unit (specialist armed police, like the Met’s SO19) and Irish special forces, known as the Army Ranger Wing.

These will fulfill a myriad of roles, including, surveillance, close protection, air defense (a dissident plot to buy surface-to-air missile launchers was recently uncovered) and crowd control within Dublin itself. Although the threat from dissidents remains high, as seen by the viable and hoax IEDs reported this morning, the Guards are more concerned with the prospects of violent protest. To this end, over 30 streets in Dublin have been closed and riot police traveling in fleets of buses will follow the Queen on her journey around the country.

The itinerary itself is bold and ambitious for the first visit by a British monarch in 100 years. Today, the Queen will visit the Garden of Remembrance in Dublin city center, where she will lay a wreath and observe a minutes silence at the foot of a memorial dedicated to those who” fought for Irish freedom”

It will be a hugely symbolic and historic moment, hopefully not disrupted by the groups of dissenting nationalists who plan to broadcast anti-British rebel reels through speakers to disrupt the ceremony.

But neither will any of the public be able to catch a glimpse of the Queen. Security is so tight that no members of the public will be able to get anywhere near the Garden, according to reports.

Another of the 11 venues on the Queen’s agenda is Croke Park, the home of the Gaelic Athletic Association and the sight of the infamous British massacre of 1920. Hopefully that visit will go some way to healing old wounds.

Tomorrow will also see a visit to the War Memorial at Islandbridge, where the Queen will pay her respects to over 300,000 Irishmen who served and over 40,000 who died, many fighting for Britain, in the First and Second World Wars.

The Queen’s visit marks an interesting point in the continuing evolution of Anglo-Irish relations, perhaps finally and comprehensively showing both nations coming to terms with their often diverse, sometimes antagonistic, yet strangely common, collective pasts. This visit I believe, highlights these.

An old historiographic saying holds “The Irish would do well to begin letting go of the past, the English would do well to begin remembering it.”

For us Irish it shows that we are growing up, for the English that they are owning up. 

Either way, for those responsible for the multi-faceted security operation, the next four days will be tense.

Symbolic significance of Al-Qaeda leader’s death has far reaching geo-political implications.

 While the symbolism of killing Osama Bin Laden is a major victory for the West in its long war against Jihadi terrorism, “decapitation” of a Hydra-like organisation is as futile as trying to ‘kill’ an idea, writes former Army Captain Patrick Bury.

Killing Bin Laden is important for three reasons: firstly, the rough justice it serves to victims of the 9/11 bombings. Secondly, the unequivocal message it sends to international terrorists for whom each day Bin Laden remained at large was a propaganda victory: that the US can, eventually, find you and kill you, even if you are being protected by a so called ally. And thirdly, it denies the much degraded jihadi movement its symbolic figurehead and one of its strategic planners.

According to Peter Bergen’s ‘The Longest War’, since the September 11th attacks, Bin Laden issued over thirty video and audio tapes which have been watched by many millions around the globe. These tapes have not only instructed Al Qaeda affiliates to continue their mission of killing Westerners and Jews, they have also often given specific instructions that have been carried out by Bin Laden’s accomplices to devastating effect.

In 2003, Bin Laden called for attacks against coalition members in Iraq: soon after the British consulate in Turkey was attacked. Commuters on their way to work in Madrid were bombed in 2004, an act that convinced Spain to pull its troops out of Iraq altogether. In December 2006, Bin Laden called for attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure: in February 2006 Al Qaeda operatives duly attacked the most important oil production facility in the world in Abqaiq. And in 2007, after Bin Laden called for attacks on the Pakistani state, suicide bombings rose sharply in the country.

So Bin Laden was not just a symbolic figure in the world of Jihadi terrorism; he had operational knowledge and/or control of terror plots that were carried out around the globe by various groups. However, the September 11th attacks marked Bin Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s zenith of power. Pursued by the US intelligence services and with a $25 million bounty on his head, the wealthy Saudi with royal connections was forced into a lifestyle that meant he could not maintain day to day oversight of Al Qaeda operations. But the “hermit on the hilltop” still kept the ideological flame of Jihadism alight.

In a private study of over 600 extremists arrested in Saudi Arabia in the last eight years, participants said Osama Bin Laden was their most important role model. In a 2008 study of Muslim opinion in Morocco, Indonesia, Jordan and Turkey, respondents expressed more “confidence” in the Al Qaeda icon than in President George Bush. Even in Pakistan last year, approval ratings for the most wanted man in the world stood at 18 per cent, according to one source. If this man could inspire whole populations through his ideology, he also certainly had no problem inspiring fellow extremists.

Mohammed Sidique Khan, the leader of the group that carried out the July 2005 London bombings, described Bin Laden and his  second in command, Ayman Al Zawahiri, as his “heroes”. Similarly, Abdullah Ali, the ringleader of a plot to destroy aircraft over the Atlantic in 2006 declared in his ‘martyrdom’ video that: “Sheikh Osama warned you many times to leave our lands or you will be destroyed”.  Nicky Reilly, a 22-year-old covert to Islam, wrote in his suicide note that: “Sheik Usama has told you how to end this war… but you ignore us… Leave our lands and stop your support for Israel”, before attempting to blow himself up in an Exeter restaurant in 2008.

Such an efficient summary of Bin Laden’s basic politico- religious message by a disturbed young British man demonstrates the traction that his ideology can have with both home grown extremists, seasoned jihadi terrorists and elements of wider Muslim populations alike. And it is precisely due to this strength of Bin Laden’s ideological currency that the importance of his death on Sunday evening is undermined.

For Bin Laden, his Islamic crusade was not against the West per se. It was against the West’s foreign policy, most notably America’s, and its support for Israel. In this it is interesting to note that Bin Laden never used the liberal West’s way of life as a pre-text for attacks. Instead, enraged by the loss of Jerusalem to Israel in 1967, Israel’s invasion of the Lebanon in 1982, and the presence of American troops on Saudi soil after the Iraq war in 1991, he said he felt the loss of Muslim lands to the infidel “like a burning fire in my intestines”. And driving this loss, in Bin Laden’s basic strategic view, was the tacit support of America for Israeli actions and ‘apostate’ regimes in the Middle East. Indeed, it is this tenet of his ideology that gives it traction with a small percentage of Muslims around the world. And it is the basic truth within this vision that will see it endure long after his death.

So, Bin Laden’s ideology will live on. But what of his organisation? Severely depleted and dispersed to avoid detection, Al Qaeda will still remain a global threat in some shape or form for years to come. Zawahiri is still at large, and has more operational control over the loose organisation than its iconic figurehead had. Even killing him may not be enough. Cutting off the heads of the Al Qaeda Hydra is not the best way of defeating an organisation that has as its basis an idea. Moreover, martyrdom is expected and hoped for amongst hard core members of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, many who will see Bin Laden’s death as he himself did: “as a beacon that arouses the zeal and determination of (our) followers”.

But there will be other significant repercussions to Bin Laden’s death. The location of his capture, barely a kilometre from the Pakistani equivalent of Sandhurst, will further sour already deteriorating US-Pakistan relations. That elements of the Pakistani intelligence services could be as duplicitous to allow the key fugitive of an ally to hide safely in a relatively obvious compound does not bode well for the future of the American-Pakistan relationship, or Pakistan’s internal dynamics. Neither does it bode well for Afghanistan, which NATO invaded to catch the newly infamous Bin Laden 10 years ago. Meanwhile, Libya’s Gaddafi has been given food for thought, and India can look forward to a budding geo-political alliance with America against Chinese and Pakistani influence.

Royal Irish 'Clear the Way' in Helmand... but what's next?

Good report on British Army's Royal Irish Regiment's efforts, progress and challenges in central Helmand this winter...

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Libya: A- Symmetry becomes Symmetrical…

Amidst the changing political landscape and the to-and-fro of the coastal battles in Libya, Gaddafi loyalist forces are adapting new tactics that complicate coalition operations and are indicative of how a-symmetry is becoming the new norm in modern warfare, writes Patrick Bury.

A-symmetrical (or“unbalanced”) tactics are those used by the weak against the strong, pitting the weaker forces’ strengths against their enemies’ weaknesses. They often ignore the international laws, formed by convention, that were designed to govern state-on state warfare. Therefore they employ “non-conventional” tactics and weapons that are as wide and varied as man’s imagination and his innate ability to harm others, and include small arms ambushes, suicide bombers, assassinations and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices. Most forces employing these tactics will use the population as a shield when conducting their operations; dressing as civilians to melt in with the local population and not carrying their arms openly. This, of course, makes them difficult to detect and destroy.

It is for precisely this reason that, in face of overwhelming coalition air strikes, it appears Gaddafi’s loyalists have ditched their conventional tactics centred on armour and artillery and taken up an a-symmetrical approach.

As a number of interesting articles over the last few days have highlighted, the loyalists have enjoyed another round of quick military successes by using highly-mobile armed groups in 4x4 vehicles to counter the rebels’ thrust. These vehicles, known as “techincals” in military parlance, have been a key factor in African warfare over the last 20 years.

Gaddafi’s loyalists are now using these vehicles decked out with Soviet-era Dushka heavy machine guns, ZPU anti-aircraft guns, 82mm mortars and Grad rocket systems to provide the majority of their firepower. They have coupled the use of these weapons with their better understanding of military tactics, flanking the rebel forces on the coastal road and then ambushing them from the desert. Such tactics have induced the panic seen in the rebels’ retreat lately.

Moreover, by using the same technicals as widely employed by the rebels, it is far harder for coalition air forces to identify friend or foe. The best way to target these smaller and more mobile forces is to have ‘eyes on’ on the ground; usually special forces relaying targets to overhead air platforms. Although intelligence and special forces assets are already operating in Libya their mission will be complicated by the fact that Gaddafi’s forces are now fighting (and may well be masquerading) as the rebels to gain tactical advantage.

It is hardly surprisng that when faced with the total superiority of coalition air-power Gaddafi’s forces have changed their tactics. What is surprising is the speed at which this has occurred. Of course, measure and counter-measure has always been a decisive part of warfare, but the speed at which Gaddafi’s forces have abandoned the conventional fight and adopted a more a-symmetrical approach show just how mainstream a-symmetry has become as a both a tactic and as a wider strategy. It also shows the limits of conventional military power. This has serious implications for the technologically superior West’s security.

Many heads of western militaries, including the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, have been at pains to highlight the changing nature of warfare and the threat it poses to conventional military power, its procurement and to political decision making. When states’ militaries seem to adopt a-symmetrical tactics this quickly, he has a point. A-symmetry, and military tactics to counter it, are now firmly in the mainstream.

In fact, at present it appears a-symmetry is the new symmetry.

Libya: NATO Takes over...Or Does It?

Last night, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that the organisation would be taking control of all military operations in Libya with “immediate effect”. However, the reality of the situation on the ground and the political wranglings needed to gain endorsement of such a takeover suggest that this will not actually occur for some days to come.

As an excellent piece in today’s Guardian has highlighted,
while NATO has appointed a Canadian General, Charles Bouchard, to command the air strikes, there seems to be a delay in handing command of them over to NATO. This cannot be fully explained by the official line that the lengthy handover period will ensure that it is smooth, as General Bouchard has been controlling the ‘No Fly Zone’ part of Operation Unified Protector since Friday. The real reason is likely to be the problems in establishing consensus for NATO operations within the alliance.

Firstly, it can be argued that the current coalition air strikes in Libya are pushing the boundary of the intent of UN Security Resolution 1973 by continuing to attack Gaddafi’s forces in areas where they may actually enjoy popular support from Libyan citizens, such as Sirte. This being the case, some NATO member states, most notably Germany and Turkey, have probably used their influence to restrict the rules of engagement for NATO air strikes once the organisation takes command of this aspect of military operations. Such restricted rules of engagement will probably curtail NATO forces from striking any forces that are not attacking civilians, therefore barring it from attacking Gaddafi’s defensive lines.

Secondly, given the rebels quick run of successes in capturing the strategically important towns of Brega and Ros Lanuf yesterday, the more bullish members of the coalition (read Britain and France) are keen to continue prosecuting their air-strikes while the rebels have momentum. They will now be hoping for a quick advance all the way to Tripoli that will ultimately unseat Gaddafi and deliver them the majority of the victor’s prestige. They understand that the air strikes have been vital in giving the rebels their momentum and have therefore managed to retain the possibility of strikes against Gaddafi’s forces for a few more days.

Finally, where does this leave NATO? Despite the overt diplomatic manoeuvring by members, the Alliance responded relatively quickly to the Libyan crisis, and prevented the high probability of a massacre of Benghazi’s citizens last week. Even if this response was relatively ad hoc, and whatever the ultimate outcome, the organisation has proved it stands alone in terms of capability and willingness to act.

But, like Britain and France, it too will be looking for a quick victory that can boost the perception of an organisation that has been damaged by involvement in Afghanistan.

The trick in an intervention such as this, therefore, is knowing when to stop. And as the history of conflict over the last half century tells us, this is the hardest trick to learn.

Left Foot Forward - The Logistics of Intervention

The Irish Times: Libyan Rebels Set For Protracted Conflict

The Irish Times: Libyan Rebels Set For Protracted Conflict http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/0317/1224292404200.html

Left Foot Forward - Growing Doubts over Afghanistan

The Irish Times: Echoes of Vietnam in Afghanistan's Conflict

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2009/1103/1224257962181.html