Libya: A- Symmetry becomes Symmetrical…

Amidst the changing political landscape and the to-and-fro of the coastal battles in Libya, Gaddafi loyalist forces are adapting new tactics that complicate coalition operations and are indicative of how a-symmetry is becoming the new norm in modern warfare, writes Patrick Bury.

A-symmetrical (or“unbalanced”) tactics are those used by the weak against the strong, pitting the weaker forces’ strengths against their enemies’ weaknesses. They often ignore the international laws, formed by convention, that were designed to govern state-on state warfare. Therefore they employ “non-conventional” tactics and weapons that are as wide and varied as man’s imagination and his innate ability to harm others, and include small arms ambushes, suicide bombers, assassinations and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices. Most forces employing these tactics will use the population as a shield when conducting their operations; dressing as civilians to melt in with the local population and not carrying their arms openly. This, of course, makes them difficult to detect and destroy.

It is for precisely this reason that, in face of overwhelming coalition air strikes, it appears Gaddafi’s loyalists have ditched their conventional tactics centred on armour and artillery and taken up an a-symmetrical approach.

As a number of interesting articles over the last few days have highlighted, the loyalists have enjoyed another round of quick military successes by using highly-mobile armed groups in 4x4 vehicles to counter the rebels’ thrust. These vehicles, known as “techincals” in military parlance, have been a key factor in African warfare over the last 20 years.

Gaddafi’s loyalists are now using these vehicles decked out with Soviet-era Dushka heavy machine guns, ZPU anti-aircraft guns, 82mm mortars and Grad rocket systems to provide the majority of their firepower. They have coupled the use of these weapons with their better understanding of military tactics, flanking the rebel forces on the coastal road and then ambushing them from the desert. Such tactics have induced the panic seen in the rebels’ retreat lately.

Moreover, by using the same technicals as widely employed by the rebels, it is far harder for coalition air forces to identify friend or foe. The best way to target these smaller and more mobile forces is to have ‘eyes on’ on the ground; usually special forces relaying targets to overhead air platforms. Although intelligence and special forces assets are already operating in Libya their mission will be complicated by the fact that Gaddafi’s forces are now fighting (and may well be masquerading) as the rebels to gain tactical advantage.

It is hardly surprisng that when faced with the total superiority of coalition air-power Gaddafi’s forces have changed their tactics. What is surprising is the speed at which this has occurred. Of course, measure and counter-measure has always been a decisive part of warfare, but the speed at which Gaddafi’s forces have abandoned the conventional fight and adopted a more a-symmetrical approach show just how mainstream a-symmetry has become as a both a tactic and as a wider strategy. It also shows the limits of conventional military power. This has serious implications for the technologically superior West’s security.

Many heads of western militaries, including the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, have been at pains to highlight the changing nature of warfare and the threat it poses to conventional military power, its procurement and to political decision making. When states’ militaries seem to adopt a-symmetrical tactics this quickly, he has a point. A-symmetry, and military tactics to counter it, are now firmly in the mainstream.

In fact, at present it appears a-symmetry is the new symmetry.

Libya: NATO Takes over...Or Does It?

Last night, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that the organisation would be taking control of all military operations in Libya with “immediate effect”. However, the reality of the situation on the ground and the political wranglings needed to gain endorsement of such a takeover suggest that this will not actually occur for some days to come.

As an excellent piece in today’s Guardian has highlighted,
while NATO has appointed a Canadian General, Charles Bouchard, to command the air strikes, there seems to be a delay in handing command of them over to NATO. This cannot be fully explained by the official line that the lengthy handover period will ensure that it is smooth, as General Bouchard has been controlling the ‘No Fly Zone’ part of Operation Unified Protector since Friday. The real reason is likely to be the problems in establishing consensus for NATO operations within the alliance.

Firstly, it can be argued that the current coalition air strikes in Libya are pushing the boundary of the intent of UN Security Resolution 1973 by continuing to attack Gaddafi’s forces in areas where they may actually enjoy popular support from Libyan citizens, such as Sirte. This being the case, some NATO member states, most notably Germany and Turkey, have probably used their influence to restrict the rules of engagement for NATO air strikes once the organisation takes command of this aspect of military operations. Such restricted rules of engagement will probably curtail NATO forces from striking any forces that are not attacking civilians, therefore barring it from attacking Gaddafi’s defensive lines.

Secondly, given the rebels quick run of successes in capturing the strategically important towns of Brega and Ros Lanuf yesterday, the more bullish members of the coalition (read Britain and France) are keen to continue prosecuting their air-strikes while the rebels have momentum. They will now be hoping for a quick advance all the way to Tripoli that will ultimately unseat Gaddafi and deliver them the majority of the victor’s prestige. They understand that the air strikes have been vital in giving the rebels their momentum and have therefore managed to retain the possibility of strikes against Gaddafi’s forces for a few more days.

Finally, where does this leave NATO? Despite the overt diplomatic manoeuvring by members, the Alliance responded relatively quickly to the Libyan crisis, and prevented the high probability of a massacre of Benghazi’s citizens last week. Even if this response was relatively ad hoc, and whatever the ultimate outcome, the organisation has proved it stands alone in terms of capability and willingness to act.

But, like Britain and France, it too will be looking for a quick victory that can boost the perception of an organisation that has been damaged by involvement in Afghanistan.

The trick in an intervention such as this, therefore, is knowing when to stop. And as the history of conflict over the last half century tells us, this is the hardest trick to learn.

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The Irish Times: Libyan Rebels Set For Protracted Conflict

The Irish Times: Libyan Rebels Set For Protracted Conflict http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/0317/1224292404200.html

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